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SETTLEMENT STANDARDS FOR MUTUAL FUND
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING THE
FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION TO RECAPTURE
Mutual fund shareholders are currently attacking, in shareholders'
derivative actions, a practice common among fund investment ad-
visers; their complaints allege that an adviser's failure to recapture
certain brokerage commissions paid by the fund constitutes a breach
of fiduciary duty both by the adviser and by the fund directors who
permitted the practice.' The plaintiff shareholders argue that the com-
missions, if recaptured, could have been credited by the investment
adviser against the management fees owed to him by the fund; 2 failure
to recapture, then, has resulted in payment of excessive management
fees by the fund.
Most of the suits now pending before the courts will probably be
resolved in out-of-court settlements. Not only do all the parties want
to avoid the time and expense required by the litigation, but a recent
decision, Moses v. Burgin,8
 appears so favorable to the shareholders'
claims that the defendants will presumably seek settlements rather
than risk trials on the merits. However, such settlements cannot be
made without judicial approval of the proposed terms of agreement.4
This requirement is imposed in derivative suits for the protection of
the many parties in interest—the shareholders—who are not before
the court.° Accordingly, the proponents of each settlement will have to
prove that its terms meet certain standards.°
The problem, then, is to determine precisely what the standards of
a fair settlement should be. Traditionally, the courts have required
that the settlement be "fair and adequate."' This requirement, how-
ever, appears to offer only a vague and elusive guide for evaluating
the settlement of suits involving issues as sophisticated as those en-
tailed in the recapture actions. Unfortunately, the courts have found it
difficult to articulate specific standards by which to gauge "fairness
and adequacy."
Past settlements appear to have been measured by judicial spec-
ulation as to the degree of success each party would have obtained
had the dispute gone to trial.' The probability of success is usually
determined at a hearing in which all interested parties are invited to
1 See Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 372 (1st Cir. 1971); Kurach v. Weisman, 49
F.R.D. 304, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
2 445 F.2d at 369.
8
 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971).
4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 23.1; Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders'
Actions—Part II: The Settlement, 23 Sw. L.J. 765, 792 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Haudeki.
8 Id. at 792-93.
8 See Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1970).
7 Id. at 774.
8 See Florida Trailer & Equip. Co. v. Deal, 284 F.2d 567, 571 (5th Cir. 1960).
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appear.' Having determined the likelihood of each party's success,
were the action to be tried, the court usually relies on that determina-
tion as the single most important factor in evaluating the settlement."
In making such determinations, however, the courts have devel-
oped no precise canons. Rather, since the plaintiffs have traditionally
enjoyed relatively little likelihood of success,' the probability stan-
dard has in reality been so lenient a measure that courts have approved
almost any settlement agreed upon by the parties. This pattern is the
result of earlier litigation, wherein shareholders had specifically alleged
that mutual funds were paying excessive management fees." In view of
the uniformity of such fees throughout the fund industry, the courts
had declined to uphold the shareholders' contention, and a majority
of the management fee cases had been settled by the shareholders on
the ground that their chances of recovery were too speculative. The
impact of this earlier litigation had a profound effect on the subsequent
recapture cases and sustained the probability of success in favor of
management.
It is submitted that Moses v. Burgin will reduce or even eliminate
the impact of the early cases. The Moses court's interpretation of the
duty to seek recapture in certain situations has pumped new content
into the probability standard, enabling it to serve as a meaningful
measure by which to evaluate the settlement agreements of the cur-
rently pending suits. It is also submitted that a second standard, an
appropriate measure of damages, should be applied by the courts. Until
recently, the plaintiffs' weak position obviated any need for precise
consideration of a settlement's fairness vis-à-vis the plaintiff's dam-
ages.' Now, however, the courts should evaluate the pending settle-
ments in terms of damages as well as the probability of success stan-
dard. Moses v. Burgin not only develops a doctrine that would give the
plaintiff a relatively high probability of success, but also offers sugges-
tions, though not definite guidelines, for determining an appropriate
measure of damages in a shareholders' suit alleging failure to recap-
ture.
After a preliminary survey of the development of recapture
theory, this comment will examine the impact that the duty, prob-
ability and damages doctrines developed or suggested in Moses may be
expected to have on the settlement of the pending derivative suits. The
fairness and adequacy of settlement offers will then be examined in
Haudek, supra note 4, at 801-06.
1° See 284 F.2d at 571.
11 See Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 39 Del. Ch. 563, 170 A.2d 720 '(1961) ; Saxe v. Brady,
40 Del. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602 (1962) ; Acanapora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527 (D. Cob,.
1963).
12 E.g., Saminsky v. Abbott, 41 Dd. Ch. 320, 327, 194 A.2d 549, 552 (1963), aff'd
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terms of both the probability of the plaintiffs' success, were the action
to come to trial, and their damages as measured by the Moses standard.
I. THE DUTY TO RECAPTURE AND THE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS
STANDARD
A. From Give-ups to the First Suggestions of a Duty to Recapture
Since a mutual fund adviser's management fees are based on a
percentage of the fund's net assets," fund advisers realize added fees
from increased sales of fund shares. Until recently, advisers frequently
stimulated the sale of shares by two devices, commonly called give-ups
and reciprocals. The advisers would direct the brokers who executed
fund share transactions to surrender to other brokers a portion of their
commissions on such transactions—give-ups"---or to transfer to them
sufficient unrelated brokerage business to result in equivalent commis-
sion income—reciprocals." The brokers who received the give-ups or
reciprocals would respond by promoting and transacting sales of fund
shares, which resulted in larger net assets and hence larger fees for the
advisers.17
 The brokers who gave up their commissions according to
the directions of the adviser were willing to do so in order to compete
successfully for the opportunity of transacting.fund portfolio business,
which yielded enormous brokerage commissions, far in excess of the
actual costs of executing the transactions." These enormous commis-
sions were in turn attributable to the fixed minimum rate structure
within the securities industry" and to the fact that volume discounts
14
 Miller & Carlson, Recapture of Brokerage Commissions by Mutual Funds, 46
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 35, 42 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Miller & Carlson].
15 Id. at 31 n.2. There are instances, where a dealer may give up part of his commis-
sion to another broker who has handled a portion of the transaction. In that situation,
there has been an actual sharing of the efforts involved in executing the trade and the
resulting fee-splitting seems to pose little regulatory problem. Report of the SEC on the
Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth, H.R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 169-70 (1966) [hereinafter cited as PPI].
16
 Miller & Carlson, supra note 14, at 36 n.6.
17 PPI, supra note 15, at 180.
18 Comment, The Use of Brokerage Commissions to Promote Mutual Fund Sales:
Time to Give Up the "Give-Up", 68 Colum. L. Rev. 334, 336 (1968). Because of give-ups
and reciprocals the actual commission charged on a transaction may be divided among
several brokers, most of whom had nothing to do with the deal, The SEC felt that such
practices led to increased competition among stock brokers and observed that:
[C]ornpetition in the securities industry between institutional managers and
brokers and between exchanges, has operated to reduce very substantially the
amount of commissions actually retained by executing brokers—but with rela-
tively little impact or effect as yet on the commissions actually paid by the public
investors who invest through institutional media.
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,523 at 83,082.
10 Miller & Carlson, supra note 14, at 37-38. This rate structure requires the im-
position of a fixed minimum brokerage commission on all orders having a value of
$500,000 or less. For that portion of each order which exceeds $500,000, negotiated rates
are permitted. SEC Policy Statement, Future Structure of the Securities Markets 28 (Feb.
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were not permitted on the nation's stock exchanges. 2° Thus the prac-
tice of awarding give-ups and reciprocals was derived from the mini-
mum rate structure and the absence of volume discounts within the
securities industry, factors which permitted brokers to collect exces-
sively large commissions on fund portfolio transactions.
The practice of awarding give-ups continued unquestioned until
1966, when the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) suggested
that the excess commissions might be used to reduce a fund's ex-
penses." The SEC pointed out that give-ups could be recaptured by
the adviser and credited against his management fee. 22 At first glance,
the Commission's suggestion seemed to run counter to the anti-rebate
rules' of the various stock exchanges. However, the SEC stated that:
It would not be inconsistent with those rules [of regional
exchanges] for dealer-distributed funds to direct give-ups to
their adviser-underwriters, all of whom are [National Asso-
ciation of Securities Dealers] members, for the purpose of
applying these give-ups to reduce the advisory fees payable
by the funds."
Moreover, the SEC noted, several funds had already begun some type
of recapture on one or more of the regional stock exchanges. 25 Al-
though the Commission's suggestion never became an official mandate,
the practice of recapturing commissions came to be unofficially tol-
erated on many regional exchanges."
1972). The SEC recently announced that no later than April, 1972, the negotiated rate
level will be reduced to $300,000. Id. at 33.
20 Miller & Carlson, supra note 14, at 37. As the term implies, "volume discounts"
refers to the practice whereby brokerage commission rates are reduced in proportion to
the increase in the size of fund portfolio transactions. Since this practice is presently not
tolerated on orders below $500,000 because of the fixed minimum commission rate
schedule, brokerage costs are significantly unrelated to the size of a transaction. Id.
21
 PPI, supra note 15 at 173.
22 Id. at 173.
23 These rules prohibit brokers from giving direct commission refunds to customers.
A typical provision is the rule set forth in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
constitution:
Commissions shall be charged and collected upon the execution of all orders
for the purchase or sale for the account of members or allied members or of
parties not members or allied members of the Exchange, of securities admitted to
dealings upon the Exchange and these commissions shall be at rates not less
than the rates in this Article prescribed; and shall be net and free from any
rebate, return, discount or allowance made in any shape or manner, or by any
method or arrangement direct or indirect.
NYSE Const., art. XV 1, as reprinted in Moses v. Burgin, 316 F. Supp. 31, 40 (D. Mass.
1970). The anti-rebate rules of other stock exchanges listed by the district court in Moses
are: Boston Exchange Const., art. XVIII, $§ 1-4; Detroit Exchange Const., art. XVIII,
§¢ 1-4; Midwest Stock Exchange Rules, art. XXIX, g§ 1-21; Pacific Coast Stock Ex-
change Const., art. XIV, f§ 1-8; Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington Exchange Const.,
art. XX, f 1-9. Id.
24
 PPI, supra note 15, at 173.
26 Id. at 172-73.
26 Stock exchanges presently allowing recapture include the Philadelphia-Baltimore-
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B. Methods of Recapture
The mutual fund industry developed two methods of effecting
recapture. One involved the placing of portfolio brokerage with a
broker affiliated with the mutual fund, such as an underwriter, rather
than with an independent firm." By placing portfolio transactions with
its affiliated underwriter, the fund achieved direct recapture, recover-
ing on its brokerage expenses by participating in the profits of the
subsidiary broker.28 The second method of recapture involved using a
broker-affiliate of the management adviser. The adviser would direct
much of the fund's brokerage business and any give-ups due from other
brokers to the subsidiary broker-dealer, whose profits would then be
credited against the adviser's management fee or taken into account
by the adviser in fixing his management fee.'
Unfortunately, notwithstanding the benefits that recapture af-
forded to funds and fund shareholders by reducing management ex-
penses, many members of the mutual fund industry failed to adopt
either method of recapture. This failure aroused the ire of knowledge-
able shareholders who, already concerned about what they regarded as
the exorbitant compensation paid to fund investment advisers, insti-
tuted numerous derivative suits against fund directors and advisers,
alleging that the failure to recapture commissions constituted a breach
of fiduciary duty. 8°
C. Development of a Duty to Recapture Doctrine and a New
Probability Standard
This history of unfavorable settlements proved to be a disadvan-
tage to the plaintiffs bringing recapture suits, which in essence were a
new form of attack on management fees. The courts, applying the
likelihood of success test, found the plaintiffs' position weak and ap-
proved concomitantly weak settlements. Kurach v. Weissmanui illus-
trates how application of the probability of success test, combined with
precedent apparently unfavorable to their cause, frustrated the plain-
Washington, Midwest, Pacific Coast and Boston Stock Exchanges. The Cincinnati Stock
Exchange does not have any institutionally affiliated brokers through whom recapture
might be effected; however, the Exchange's rules do not prohibit the membership of such
brokers. Wall Street Journal, March 2, 1972, at 2, cols. 3-4.
27 Glazer, A Study of Mutual Fund Complexes, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev, 205, 243 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Glazer].
28 Id.
29 Id. at 243-44. It should be noted that customer-directed give-ups were tolerated
until abolished on December 5, 1968. Although the SEC had drafted a proposal to end
give-ups, the Commission did not promulgate the rule which finally abolished them. The
SEC's Rule 10b-10 was not enacted into law because the various stock exchanges elimi-
nated the use of customer-directed give-ups on their own. See SEC Release No. 8239, 33
Fed. Reg. 2393 (1968).
ao It is estimated that more than 50 lawsuits challenging this failure to recapture
are presently pending before the courts. See Brief for Defendants at 11-12, Gross v.
Moses, 71 Civ. 2162 (S.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 13, 1971).
91 49 F.R.D. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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tiffs' attempt to win a strong settlement. In Kurach, a shareholders'
derivative suit against the Dreyfus Fund and the fund's management
company, the shareholders alleged that the management fee of one-half
of one percent of the net assets of the fund was excessive because a
portion of the commissions of the adviser's broker-affiliate could have
been recaptured and applied against the fee." Relying on earlier
management fee cases," the court found that the plaintiffs' likelihood
of success did not appear strong. Hence it approved the defendants'
settlement offer to effect future recapture and to credit, over a five-
year period, one million dollars of returns from recapture against the
fund's management fee obligation. The token offer, "modest as it may
appear to be,"" was deemed a reasonable disposition of the action.
The court found no duty to recapture. It took the position that
the investment adviser's broker-affiliate was riot obligated to turn
brokerage profits over to the fund and that the adviser was not re-
quired to credit the profits against his management fee." The court
derived this determination from its interpretation of Section 17(e) of
the Investment Company Act of 1940," which authorizes fund ad-
visers to receive, subject to express limitations, commissions from their
broker-affiliates in connection with fund portfolio transactions." The
court determined that the statute's authorization of the adviser's right
to receive commissions included implicit authorization of his right to
retain those commissions;" accordingly, section 17(e) appeared to
rebut the plaintiffs' assertions that the adviser should have applied
brokerage profits to reduce his fee. Hence the court found that the
defendants' offer to enter into future recapture and reduce the manage-
ment fee by $1,000,000 over a five-year period would result in a fair
and reasonable settlement.
The SEC opposed the settlement offer on the grounds that the
agreement was illusory and gave to the shareholders only what they
were already entitled to at law." The SEC based its contention on the
fact that many of the commissions acquired by the broker-affiliate
were give-ups and reciprocals and hence should not have been retained
32 Id. at 305.
33
 See note 11 supra. The courts generally have felt powerless to intervene in this
area of the mutual fund industry—except in cases where the fee is "wasteful," "uncon-
scionable," or "shocking." PPI, supra note 15, at 142. Based on the fact that investment
companies' advisory fees are approved annually by a majority of the unaffiliated direc-
tors, subject to ratification by the stockholders, the courts declined to hold such fees
excessive. Moreover, shareholder ratification shifts the standard for determining fairness
of an investment adviser's fee from one of fairness to one of waste. No court was willing
to hold such fees excessive or wasteful where the advisory contract secured shareholder
approval. See Glazer, supra note 27, at 260-61.
84 49 F.R.D. at 307.
85 Id.
36
 15 U.S.C. 80a-17(e) ( 1 9 70).
87
 These statutory limitations have been imposed to prevent brokerage commissions
from exceeding a certain' level. Miller & Carlson, supra note 14, at 44 n.50.
38 49 F.R.D. at 307.
3° Id.
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by the broker. The Commission argued that the profits derived from
these sources were not earned as a result of the performance of any
services for the fund, and accordingly should have been credited
against management fees payable by the fund to the adviser.
However, the court neither accepted this argument nor examined
all of the facts germane to the issue of recapture. Rather, the court was
satisfied that prior management fee decisions, which indicated that the
defendants probably would have been successful at trial, obviated the
need for further consideration of recapture. 4° Then, having ascertained
a probability of success on the part of the defendants, the court ap-
peared willing to approve any settlement offer agreeable to both
parties. It is submitted that such an approach, which virtually fore-
closed any opportunity for the plaintiffs to develop grounds for a
favorable settlement, provided little or no protection for those share-
holders who could not examine the settlement proposal. Indeed, it
could be argued that the court's summary approval of the token settle-
ment constituted an abrogation of its responsibility as guardian of the
shareholders' interests.
However, after the Kurach settlement had been approved, the
SEC issued an administrative ruling that clearly articulated the argu-
ment which the Commission had originally postulated in Kurach and
squarely opposed the Kurach court's interpretation of section 17(e).
In Provident Management Corp.," a fund's investment adviser re-
ceived and retained reciprocal commissions from its broker-affiliate,
which had received the reciprocals in the first place from brokers to
whom the adviser had allotted fund portfolio transactions. The SEC,
relying on Section 17(e) of the Investment Company Act, reasoned
that "a fund affiliate which has in fact entered into reciprocal arrange-
ments whereby it recaptured a portion of fund brokerage cannot,
consistent with its fiduciary obligations to the fund, retain for itself
the benefits derived."' Section 17(e) declares that it is unlawful for
any person affiliated with a registered investment company and "acting
as [its] agent, to accept from any source any compensation . . . for
the purchase or sale of any property to or for such registered [invest-
ment] company . . . except in the course of such person's business as
[a] . . . broker. . . ."" The Commission ruled that the phrase "acting
as a broker" required the broker-affiliate to perform some type of
service or function with regard to the transaction that gave rise to the
commission."
In an amicus curiae brief opposing a settlement in a later case,
the Commission developed this interpretation of Section 17(e):
4° Id.
41 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5115 (Dec. 1, 1970), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,937, at 80,083.
42 Id. at 80,087 n.14.
42 15 U.S.C. $ 80a-17(e) (1970) (emphasis added).
44 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5115 (Dec. 1, 1970), 11970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. Rep, 177,937, at 80,088.
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Of course, a brokerage affiliate of the investment adviser
does not perform any brokerage services, and is thus not
acting as a "broker," when it receives reciprocals. The recip-
rocals are paid to the affiliate simply because the affiliate's
parent, the adviser, has the power to direct or has directed
the fund's portfolio transactions to the reciprocating broker."
However, despite the clear support given to the shareholders' position
by the SEC's recapture doctrine, the Commission's ruling in Provident
Management was not a judicial determination on which plaintiffs could
rely. Hence Provident Management did not represent a decisive shift
in favor of plaintiff-shareholders' probability of success in recapture
litigation. Nevertheless, the ruling weakened the favorable position
enjoyed by defendants in such litigation and had a corrosive effect on
Kurach and similar approvals of settlements favorable to defendants.
D. Moses v. Burgin
The implications of Provident Management were realized in
Moses v. Burgin," in which the First Circuit provided the first thor-
ough judicial examination of recapture and its associated issues. In
Moses, the defendants—the investment adviser, the adviser's under-
writer and certain directors of a mutual fund—endorsed a policy to
promote sales of fund shares by awarding give-ups to brokers who had
sold such shares to the public. The defendants committed the fund to
this policy notwithstanding the fact that representatives of the SEC
and an SEC report," published in 1966, had suggested that it might
be advantageous for the fund to recapture the fund's give-ups. More-
over, the defendants had failed to inform the fund's unaffiliated, or
"watch-dog," directors" of the possibility of recapture. Rather, the
court later found, the defendants had - actively concealed this informa-
tion froni thoie directors even though the possibility of recapture en-
tailed a potential conflict between the management company's interests
and the interests of the fund's shareholders."
45
 Brief for Defendants, Gross v. Moses, supra note 30, at 12.
45 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971).
47 PPI, supra note 15 at 173.
48 These unaffiliated directors have been defined as follows:
The principal safeguard provided by [Section 10(a) of] the Investment Com-
pany Act, against overreaching by managers or advisers, is the so-called unaf-
filiated director [of a mutual fund] which means in plain English a presumably
independent director, which in turn means that he is supposed to safe-guard the
public—he's a watchdog—against the human tendency of management to take
as much as they can get away with, short of being caught by us cops, or triggers,
[sic] or the SEC or someone else. . . . Who picks the unaffiliated directors? The
affiliated men pick the unaffiliated men. The men who need to be watched pick
the watchdogs to watch them.
Comment, The Mutual Fund Management Fee, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 726, 739 (1967).
45 The court noted that this potential conflict was based on the fact "that the prin-
cipal beneficiaries of fund-paid portfolio commiggions are not the funds, but the ad-
visers and underwriters." 445 F.2d at 377. Thus, any reductions in these commissions by
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In response to this situation, shareholders brought a derivative
action alleging that the defendants had violated their fiduciary duties
as imposed by the Investment Company Act of 1940" and the common
law. More specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the adviser's failure
to recapture a portion of the brokerage paid on fund portfolio trans-
actions constituted a gross abuse of trust under Section 36 of the Act."
The shareholders also argued that since the management adviser's fee
was based on a percentage of the fund's net assets, the adviser's use of
give-ups to reward brokers for increased sales of fund shares benefited
the adviser to the detriment of the fund's investors. The defendants
replied that even if recapture were in fact a practical possibility, the
directors still had a right to choose between recapturing the give-ups
for the fund's direct benefit and awarding them to brokers for its
indirect benefit; in short, that the decision lay within the area of dis-
cretion committed to the directors' business judgment.
The court dismissed the defendants' argument, ruling that where
recapture was freely available, the directors had no choice but to
utilize recapture for the benefit of the fund. The court reasoned that:
If Fund receives the asset value of new shares, but at the
same time rewards the selling broker with give-ups that it has
a right to recapture for itself, then the net income Fund re-
ceives from the process of selling a share is less than asset
value. The existing shareholders have contributed—by pay-
ing more than otherwise necessary on Fund's portfolio trans-
means of recapture would benefit the fund; conversely, any failure to recapture would
benefit the adviser.
5° 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 et seq. (1970).
51 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 36, ch. 686, § 36, 54 Stat. 841. This section
authorized the SEC to obtain injunctive relief against the officers, directors, adviser and
principal underwriter of a mutual fund if they have "been guilty . . . of gross miscon-
duct or gross abuse of trust in respect of" the fund. Although § 36 allowed the SEC to
bring suit for management breaches of fiduciary duty, it neglected to state whether a
shareholder was authorized to bring such an action. Even so, some courts interpreted
the section as permitting shareholder suits. The amended version of * 36 clearly autho-
rizes such suits and treats a fund's investment adviser as a fiduciary with respect to
management compensation. The new provision states:
For the purposes of this subsection, the investment adviser of a registered invest-
ment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the
receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature, paid
by such registered investment company, or by the security holders thereof, to
such investment adviser or any affiliated person of such investment adviser. An
action may be brought under this subsection by. the Commission, or by a se-
curity holder of such registered investment company on behalf of such company,
against such investment adviser, or any affiliated person of such investment ad-
viser, or any other person enumerated in subsection (a) of this section who has
a fiduciary duty concerning such compensation or payments, for breach of fidu-
ciary duty in respect of such compensation or payments paid by such registered
investment company or by the security holders thereof to such investment ad-
viser or person.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b).(1970).
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actions—to the cost of the sale, which was supposed to have
been borne by the new member alone."
Hence Moses would require a fund's investment management adviser
to credit against the fund's management fee the commissions obtained
on fund brokerage by a broker affiliate of the fund or the adviser,
where such commissions are recovered by the adviser.
On the other hand, Moses does not go so far as to require a fund's
directors to create an affiliated broker in order to effect recapture. In
fact, the Moses court agreed with the defendants when it stated that
"sound business reasons" 53 might militate against switching from
independent to affiliated brokers. When questioned on this precise
issue, the SEC agreed with the court's position:
You ask first whether mutual fund management has a
fiduciary duty to acquire a stock-exchange seat, directly or
through an affiliate, in order to utilize this means to recapture
brokerage which in turn will be offset against management
charges. We do not believe that management has this duty if
in the exercise of its best business judgment management de-
termines that it is not in the best interest of the fund to create
such an affiliate'
In short, then, the Moses court held that while a fund's management
adviser has no absolute fiduciary duty to acquire a broker-affiliate in
order to effect recapture, but rather may exercise its business judg-
ment in the matter, such a duty does exist where there is an existing
affiliation.
Moses established a legal duty to recapture, in certain circum-
stances, and so increased significantly the shareholders' probability of
success in the pending recapture litigation. Hence the defendants in
these suits will be more inclined to offer, and the courts more inclined
to require, settlements that reflect the favorable position enjoyed by
shareholder-plaintiffs since the First Circuit decided Moses.
E. Pending Litigation: The Impact of Moses and Provident
Management on the Duty to Recapture and the Plaintiffs'
Probability of Success
Over fifty shareholder derivative suits with fact situations similar
to that in Moses are presently pending before the courts 55 and many
are awaiting approval of their settlement offers. Two pending deriva-
tive actions recently consolidated, Gross v. Moses" and Edelman v.
52 445 F.2d at 374.
53 Id. at 375.
54 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8746 (Nov. 10, 1969), (1969-1970
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. Rep. if 77,761 at 83,747.
55 See note 30 supra.
55 67 Civ. 4186 (S.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 13, 1971).
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Brown," were brought on behalf of funds managed by Massachusetts
Financial Services, Inc., an investment advisory company. The plain-
tiffs in this consolidated action, as in the other recapture cases, had
charged the management company with failing to recapture portfolio
brokerage commissions for their respective funds. The defendants
have offered to reduce the management fee by entering into recapture.
The investment adviser agreed to seek membership on certain regional
exchanges that allow members to enter into recapture and so permit
a portion of the "net profits" derived from fund brokerage transactions
to be credited against the advisory fee." The management company
further guaranteed recapture of a minimum amount over a period of
ten years."
However, the SEC is opposing the settlement proposed by the
Gross and Edelman defendants,°" claiming that the agreements are
illusory. More specifically, it is argued that the agreements provide no
benefits to the mutual funds or their shareholders since less than con-
formance to applicable law is required," and no consideration for past
violations is provided." The thrust of the SEC's argument seems to
be that once the management company has decided to recapture
brokerage for the fund, it cannot impose a limit, absent approval by
the fund, on the length of time during which recaptured commissions
will be applied against the advisory fee. The Commission stressed
that this position was supported by Moses and Provident Management,
which required management defendants to credit the investment fee
with recaptured brokerage until such time as the fund's directors de-
termined that recapture was no longer in the best interests of the fund
and its shareholders." The Moses court held that where recapture is
freely available to a fund, the defendants have no choice as to whether
such brokerage will be used for the fund's benefit or for that of the
management company. Defendants are under a duty to utilize recap-
tured commissions for the fund's direct benefit.
However, in Gross and Edelman recapture had not been "freely
available" prior to the suit, as it had been in the Moses situation.
Neither the adviser nor the fund, in Gross and Edelman, have an
existing broker-affiliate. Rather, the adviser has now offered, as part
of a settlement agreement, to seek membership on stock exchanges."
Hence Gross and Edelman raise the question as to whether the Moses
duty to recapture applies to situations where the adviser voluntarily
87 71 Civ. 2162 (S.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 13, 1971),
88 Brief for Defendants, Gross v. Moses, supra note 30, at 5.
49 Defendants agreed to recapture a minimum of $1,500,000 over a 10 year period. Id.
at 6.
80 Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, Gross v. Moses, 67 Civ, 4186 (S.D.N.Y., filed
Aug. 13, 1971) [hereinafter cited as SEC Brief},
el Id. at 8-16.
02 Id. at 17-18.
88 Id. at 11-12.
84 See Brief for Defendants, Gross v, Moses, supra note 30, at 5.
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assumes the obligation as part of a settlement to end a shareholder suit.
Moses would seem to support such an obligation, since the court
found that such a duty existed where it was at all practicable for an
investment adviser to effect recapture.° 5
 It would seem reasonable to
assume that if recapture is undertaken voluntarily by the adviser, even
as a result of the settlement of a legal dispute, then it is practicable to
effect; hence, a continuing duty to effect recapture should arise from
that undertaking. Moreover, since most courts will not second-guess
the judgment of directors in business decisions, but will decide
"whether a reasonable board could have reached"°8 the same decision
—applying the business judgment rule"—that principle would seem to
control here. Once the adviser determines that recapture is in the best
interests of the fund, any failure to recapture—or any arbitrary time
limit upon the future operation of recapture—would appear to conflict
with the initial determination. Hence failure to recapture, even though
recapture was first undertaken in a settlement situation, would appear
to be in derogation of a duty owed to the fund by its management
adviser.
The SEC argues also that imposition of the duty to recapture,
even where the obligation is initially undertaken voluntarily, is sup-
ported by the Commission's ruling in Provident Management." There,
the SEC had ruled that give-ups and reciprocals actually received in
connection with fund portfolio transactions had to be credited "against
Fund's contractual obligation to pay its advisory fee."' In light of
this ruling, the SEC in Gross and Edelman contends that, notwith-
standing the fact that management's decision to enter into recapture
was based on a desire to settle the current litigation, once recapture
was determined to be in the best interests of the fund, the defendants
had a duty to continue the practice."
On the other hand, the defendants in Gross and Edelman argue
that their agreement to enter into the brokerage business is ample
consideration for settling the litigation, since a management company
is under "no duty—fiduciary or otherwise—to enter the brokerage
business or become a member of a stock exchange." 71 Furthermore,
the defendants contend that the SEC is unjustified in its assertion that
the proposed settlement provides less than the law requires. In support
of this position, the defendants argue that "entry into the brokerage
business involves a substantial commitment of time and money and the
015 445 F.2d at 374.
00 Miller & Carlson, Recapture of Brokerage Commissions by Mutual Funds, 46
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 35, 46 (1972).
97 Id.
08 SEC Brief, supra note 60, at 11-12.
69 Id. at 12.
70 Id.
71 Brief for Defendants, Gross v. Moses, supra note 30, at 23.
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assumption of serious and substantial risks." 72 Consequently, the de-
fendants believe that their offer is a significant concession which goes
beyond the fiduciary obligations established by the First Circuit in
Moses.
A narrow reading of that decision may afford some support to the
defendants' position. The Moses court's determination was directed
solely to the defendants' duty to recapture give-ups. The decision did
not involve reciprocal brokerage. Therefore it may be argued that the
adviser's duty to recapture for the fund's benefit extends only to situa-
tions where give-ups are concerned. Assuming this to be the case, an
offer to enter into the brokerage business and recapture reciprocal
commissions for the fund may provide fair and adequate consideration
for settlements since such an arrangement would be more than the
defendants are required to provide according to law. It should be
noted, however, that even though the decision in Moses did not directly
involve the use of reciprocals, the First Circuit suggested that granting
reciprocals in some instances might conflict with the duty to recap-
ture:8
In any case, other factors appear to rebut the defendants' argu-
ment. The SEC's ruling in Provident Management required a fund-
affiliate to use for the fund's benefit reciprocal brokerage received
from fund portfolio brokerage transactions. Furthermore, reciprocals
are similar to give-ups in that they both flow from excess commissions
on portfolio transactions and are paid to a broker on order of the
adviser. In short, the decision in Moses and the ruling in Provident
Management apparently require the conclusion that, while there is no
duty to enter into affiliation to effect recapture, whenever an arrange-
ment has been made—whether in the context of litigation settlement or
not—then a duty to recapture for the benefit of the fund and its share-
holders is imposed. In addition, it is submitted that the probability of
success standard requires a settlement favorable to the shareholders in
Gross and Edelman. When Kurach was decided, the law was arguably
in favor of the defendants, or at least the plaintiffs' probability of suc-
cess was virtually nonexistent. However, Moses has since shifted that
probability decidedly in favor of the shareholders. Thus, absent a
determination that the plaintiffs' claims are frivolous, the Gross and
Edelman court should reject the settlement proposal because it con-
stitutes a grossly inadequate reflection of the plaintiffs' favorable
probability of success.
72 Id. at 24.
73 The court stated that:
We see no reason to reject the SEC's conclusion that awarding reciprocals even
to brokers who have done nothing to benefit the funds is unobjectionable. . .
This is not to say that granting reciprocals in some particular instance may not
conflict with the duty to recapture.
445 F.2d at 372 n.5 (emphasis added).
1051
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
F. The 1972 SEC Policy Statement: Impact on the
Pending Litigation74
To date, Moses remains the law with respect to recapture. How-
ever, several recent developments have had, and may continue to have,
an impact on that decision. The SEC, which earlier argued that a duty
to recapture exists in a management/broker-affiliate situation, has now
disclosed an intention to limit institutional membership—that is,
membership of brokers affiliated with financial institutions"—on
stock exchanges" and thereby inhibit recapture arrangements. In a
recent policy statement the SEC stated that it will seek legislation to
prohibit the membership on stock exchanges of those firms whose
primary function is to recapture brokerage commissions.77 The Com-
mission's basic contention is that to allow institutional membership
merely for the purpose of effecting recapture is to permit exchange
membership to be used for private rather than public purposes."
Essentially, the Commission reasoned that as long as the industry is
beset with a fixed minimum commissions rate structure, "large in-
vestors should not, by virtue of their economic power and size, be
entitled to obtain rebates of commissions not available to [small, indi-
vidual] investors."'" The Commission considers that such private use
of stock exchanges frustrates the public's confidence in the securities
market."
The Commission's dramatic shift from its earlier position on re-
capture raises the question whether the failure to recapture will pro-
vide. a cause of action for shareholders in future litigation. However,
the new policy statement should not limit the impact of Moses on the
plaintiffs' probability of success in the more than fifty pending recap-
ture suits. The Moses court has made it clear that there are legal
methods of recapture and circumstances wherein recapture is legally
required. Thus, even if the courts should accept the Commission's
new position, this shift should have only a prospective influence on
the probability of success factor; the pending actions are concerned
14 SEC Policy Statement, Future Structure of the Securities Markets (Feb. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as SEC Policy Statement].
78 For a discussion of, and an argument for, institutional membership, see Wetherill
Hender, Institutional Membership and the Experience of the Philadelphia-Baltimore-
Washington Stock Exchange, at p. 1021 supra.
78 SEC Policy Statement, supra note 74, at 53-54.
77 Id. The SEC has stated that all exchange members should be required to conduct
"public" brokerage business and that "any brokerage firm which is not doing a Pre-
dominant portion of its brokerage commission business for non-affiliated persons should
not be considered to be conducting a public brokerage business." Id. at 53 (emphasis
added). The Commission also indicated that "[p]redominant means • . • significantly
more than half." Id. at 54. Recently the SEC stated that "predominant" means "sig-
nificantly more than two-thirds" and perhaps 90%. The N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1972, 3
(Business and Finance), at 9, col. 2.
78 SEC Policy Statement, supra note 74, at 47.
78 Id. at 46-47.
80 Id. at 47-48.
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with a period of time when management defendants could have and
should have recaptured brokerage commissions.
Moreover, the SEC's proposed restriction on institutional mem-
bership has been attacked by several regional stock exchanges which
support such membership, particularly the Philadelphia-Baltimore-
Washington Exchange (P-B-W), which has indicated that it will
fight the SEC proposa1. 8 ' In addition, members of Congress have
criticized the Commission's policy,' and Senator Harrison A. Williams,
chairman of the Senate Banking Subcommittee, has introduced a bill
which would temporarily enjoin implementation of the SEC plan in
order to allow Congress to study the situation. 83
It must be admitted, however, that although the proposed restric-
tion on institutional membership apparently would not impair the
plaintiffs' favorable position in the pending litigation, such a restriction
could affect the mode of settling those actions. If recapture is to be
limited by legislation or by SEC rulings, then an offer to enter into
recapture arrangements as a means of settlement might become inade-
quate and hence unacceptable to the courts. Accordingly, pending
offers of settlement would have to take some other form, and settle-
ments already reached would have to be modified insofar as they were
based on agreements to recapture.
IL THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
Although a determination of the plaintiffs' probability of success
is essential to the evaluation of the fairness and adequacy of a settle-
ment proposal in recapture litigation, this factor must be considered
in conjunction with the damages sustained by the aggrieved share-
holders. These damages may be simply defined as the loss of the value
of brokerage commissions which could have been recaptured by a
fund's adviser. This description, however, fails to suggest the difficulty
experienced by most courts in determining such a value," a difficulty
attributable to the lack of basic guidelines for the courts to follow in
determining where, when and in what amounts commissions could have
been recaptured. The sophisticated nature of fund portfolio transac-
tions," coupled with the courts' tendency to defer to the business
judgment of fund advisers, 83 has apparently constituted another
obstacle to a successful judicial determination of an appropriate
measure of damages. For these reasons, prior to Moses v. Burgin,
courts usually approved any settlement offer whose terms appeared to
reflect the probability of success.
81 See Wall Street Journal, March 2, 1972, at 2, cols. 3-4, and Wetherill & Hender,
supra note 75, at 1023.
82 See Wall Street Journal, Feb. 3, 1972, at 3, cot. 2.
83 S. 3169, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
84 E.g., Kurach v. Weisman, 49 F.R.D. 304, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
85 The nature of these transactions is generally discussed in Miller & Carlson, supra
note 66, at 42-44.
86 E.g., Moses v. Burgin, 316 F. Supp. 31, 58 (D. Mass. 1970).
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Moses, the first and thus far the only recapture case to reach trial
on the merits, is also the only recapture case in which the shareholders'
measure of damages was given adequate judicial scrutiny. Moses did
not establish a definitive standard by which to determine damages in
recapture litigation. However, the decision did set forth basic guide-
lines for computing such damages, guidelines which should provide
invaluable assistance to courts evaluating settlement proposals in
pending or future recapture disputes.
A. Exchanges on Which Loss Was Incurred
In ascertaining the value of brokerage commissions which could
have been recaptured for the benefit of the plaintiffs, the Moses court
found that it was first necessary to determine on which exchanges
recapture was allowed." Absent proof as to which exchanges permit
recapture, the aggrieved shareholders would be unable to establish
where recapture should have been effected. Accordingly, the plaintiffs
could not show the extent of loss incurred. The plaintiffs in Moses
established only that the Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington Stock
Exchange and the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange (PCSE) permitted
recapture situations"---i.e., allowed membership on the exchange by
brokers affiliated with financial institutions. The court acknowledged
that other exchanges probably allowed recapture, but ruled that the
"initial burden" was on the shareholders to prove that they did so."
Since the plaintiffs had not offered the requisite proof at trial before
the lower court, the appellate court refused to allow further considera-
tion of the question."
The plaintiffs did introduce evidence indicating that only two of
the regional exchanges asked if they would permit recapture responded
affirmatively, while none of the national exchanges did so." Those
exchanges that refused to allow institutional membership, and thus
prohibited recapture, did so on the grounds that tolerating recapture
would conflict with their anti-rebate rules. However, it should be noted
that, after this inquiry had been made, other regional exchanges
relaxed their admissions requirements and began to allow institutional
membership 92 Moreover, as noted earlier, the SEC has recently pro-
posed that all exchanges admit institutional members, provided that
those members perform a "predominant portion" of their business for
the general public rather than for their affiliate institutions." These
developments, increasing the availability of recapture arrangements,
should substantially mitigate the shareholders' burden of proof on the
87 445 F.2d at 384.
88 Id.
89 Id.
99 The court stated that "[Obis issue seems to us to fall, strictly, under the question
of liability, and not under questions of damages. • . ." Id.
91 See text at note 88, supra.
92 See note 26, supra.
99 SEC Policy Statement, supra note 74, at 53-54.
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exchanges issue. Indeed, should the SEC's proposal be implemented
and all exchanges required to allow recapture, all that need be estab-
lished is the extent to which recapture could be effected in light of the
"predominant portion" rule.
Having established which exchanges allowed recapture, the plain-
tiffs then had to show that the defendants had been in a position to
utilize those exchanges for the fund's portfolio transactions." The
plaintiffs in Moses were able to establish that their fund's adviser
owned an underwriter which could have entered into recapture for the
fund on both the P-B-W and PCSE, and that the exchanges would
allow the underwriter to receive give-ups which could then be credited
against the funds' advisory fee."
B. Date From Which Defendants Should Have Begun Recapture
Having ascertained where recapture could have been effected, the
Moses court then ruled that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to estab-
lish the date from which the defendants "should have been alerted" to
the fact that recapture was possible.96 This date is an important ele-
ment in the computation of damages, since it enables the courts to
ascertain the specific period of time—beginning with this date and
ending when recapture is implemented—within which the transactions
giving rise to the shareholders' loss occurred. Inherent in the court's
ruling that the defendants were liable from the time they "should have
been alerted" to the possibility of recapture is a determination that,
notwithstanding any legitimate initial reservations by the fund's ad-
visers as to the advisability of recapture, liability should be imposed for
every failure to recapture during this period of uncertainty if it is sub-
sequently determined that recapture would have been advantageous.
The court held that the defendants should have banked all give-ups
which might have been recaptured during the period of doubt, until
such time as they could have made an unequivocal decision on the
matter."
The problem, then, is to ascertain what particular event should
have sufficiently "alerted" the fund's adviser. The Moses court held "as
a matter of law, in view of the [SEC's 1966 mutual fund study] that
th[e] date could be no later than March 1, 1967," 8 but did not reveal
precisely why this date was chosen as an outside limit. However, it may
be surmised that the court selected the date because it represents a
period of three months after the publication, in December, 1966, of the
SEC report" which unequivocally disclosed the possibility and desir-
ability of recapture. The court apparently regarded three months as a
94 445 F.2d at 374-75.
"s Id, at 382.
90




 Report of the SEC on the Public Policy Implications of Investment Company
Growth, H.R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
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reasonable time within which the funds' advisers might begin to effect
recapture. With this "outside" date as a guide, the court ruled that de-
termining the actual date on which the defendants "should have been
alerted" presented a question of fact to be resolved on remand by the
district court "from the present record in the light of this opinion."'°°
Although the district court has not yet decided this issue, the
appellate opinion provides grounds for inferring that the lower court
could find that the period of liability began before March, 1967. The
appellate court suggested that the defendants were doubtless alerted
to the possibility of recapture on no less than three occasions. The
first occurred at SEC hearings conducted in 1965,101  a Commis-
sion official suggested to the defendants that recapture might be pos-
sible on the Detroit Stock Exchange.' The appellate court felt that
this "suggestion should clearly have imparted to Management the idea
that , its benefit [in retaining give-ups] could now conflict with Fund's
interest [in recapture].'"'s This suggestion was reintroduced to the
defendants during another SEC proceeding in September, 1966. 104 The
appellate court remarked that "by this time the conflict was clearly
laid out."'" Finally, the possibility of recapture was placed before the
entire mutual fund industry, including the defendants, by the SEC
report published in December, 1966.
It is submitted that, of these three occasions, the 1966 SEC pro-
ceedings should be found to mark the actual date from which the de-
fendants should have been alerted to the possibility of recapture. It is
conceivable that the 1965 proceeding had not adequately apprised the
defendants of the feasibility of recapture, even though they were
already aware "that the principal beneficiaries of fund-paid portfolio
commissions are not the funds, but the advisers and underwriters."'"
The court admitted that "[w]hat was new [in the 1965 proceedings]
was the suggestion of how, in fact, the interests of Fund could be
better served." 107
 In any case, by the time of the 1966 proceedings the
defendants should have become sensitive to the possibility of using
recapture in the •interests of the fund. The proceedings themselves
could then be found to constitute the occasion on which the adviser
must be considered "alerted" to the possibility of recapture, and ac-
cordingly under a duty to bank subsequent give-ups pending a final
decision on the advisability of recapture.
It is also submitted that the court was correct in determining that
100
 445 F.2d at 385.
101
 Id. at 377.
102 The defendants' response to such a suggestion was negative, at best, and they
indicated that "the change Ito recapture] would irritate dealers who had been receiving
give-ups and have a consequent bad effect upon sales." Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 378.
1°5 Id.
100 Id. at 377.
107
 Id. (emphasis added).
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the defendants should have been definitely aware of the possibility of
recapture no later than March 1, 1967. As the court succinctly stated:
[T]he September, 1966 proceedings were shortly followed by
the Commission's own, formal . . . report. Management de-
fendants, whatever their own views on the feasibility of re-
capture, were then on full notice that the possibility of
recapture was a substantial issue that directly involved their
self-interest. Any contention that the Commission's views
were off-hand or so inconsequential that Management de-
fendants were entitled to keep their own counsel . . . is, to
put it bluntly, little short of extraordinary."'
The Moses court seemed to imply that other courts, which must render
judgments or approve settlement offers in pending and future recap-
ture litigation, should accept the same "outside" date. The SEC's
published report was both available and applicable to all investment
advisers and should have put the entire industry on notice. Hence it is
submitted that the Moses date should generally be adhered to.
C. The Amount of Loss
The final question to be decided on remand was the computation
of the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiffs after the date on
which the adviser should have been "alerted." The appellate court ruled
that "the Management defendants are to be held liable for all transac-
tions, making allowances for best execution, and all resulting give-ups
that could have been recaptured on those [exchanges which allowed
recapture].' The central problem in computing damages, then, is the
problem of determining whether a certain transaction was made con-
sistent with "best execution."
In essence, best execution requires that investment management
seek the best possible price in trading a fund's portfolio securities by
purchasing those securities at the lowest possible price and selling them
at the highest.'" However, the average price per share paid on a
transaction is not the only criterion for determining whether there has
been best execution. Other factors, such as the savings realized by a
fund because of recapture, the speed with which a broker can clear
an order, or the superior service offered by a particular nonaffiliated
broker, are also important.'" For example, an immediate need to raise
cash to make a desirable investment might justify selling a stock at
less than its market price even though that price could have been
realized at some future date.
The recapture issue introduces still another variable. The district
108 Id. at 383-84 (emphasis added).
1" Id. at 385 (emphasis added).
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court first will have to decide what benefits would have been realized
by recapture and then determine whether any of the benefits derivable
from best execution would have been diminished, had the adviser
actually pursued recapture. 112
 Should the court find that recapture
would have ditninshed other benefits, it must reduce the defendants'
liability accordingly. The obvious difficulty is that it will be necessary
to examine each fund transaction individually.
It is submitted that the Moses court's decision may be inter-
preted to provide a possible response to this difficulty. It implies that,
once the first two elements of the measure of damages—on which ex-
changes and from what date recapture could have been effected—are
established, a presumption may arise, in favor of the plaintiffs, that a
transaction which could have resulted in recaptured brokerage would
have been consistent with best execution. Should this be an accurate
interpretation, the Moses decision should have a marked impact on
pending and future settlements. For example, management will have
to rebut the presumption for each transaction in which it failed to
seek recapture and show that the transaction was in fact consistent
with best execution. Nor will the adviser be relieved from the burden
of the presumption if the transaction was made on an exchange that
prohibited recapture. If a trade could be made on either of two ex-
changes, of which one allowed recapture while the other did not, and
the prices involved were identical, then best execution would demand
that the trade be performed on the exchange which favored recap-
ture.
Thus, although the Moses court did not compute the actual dam-
ages sustained by the shareholders, the court's decision did offer the
district court a clear and workable method for arriving at an appro-
priate figure. In so doing, the court has provided a valuable guide to
all courts for determining the measure of damages in recapture litiga-
tion. More particularly, tribunals which are presently sitting on pend-
ing disputes need no longer guess at the adequacy of a settlement offer
because of uncertainty as to the measure of damages. These courts can
compute this amount by determining three factors: the exchanges on
which recapture was allowed and whether the fund had the necessary
affiliations to effect recapture; the date from which the fund's adviser
should have been alerted to the possibility of recapture; and all of the
transactions, making allowances for best execution, that could have
been recaptured during that period on those exchanges. The share-
holders' loss will be the amount of commissions which could have been
recaptured. It is submitted that the expected willingness of the defen-
dants to settle these pending disputes will probably obviate the need
for a precise dollars and cents tabulation of damages by the courts,
since a settlement hearing does not require so extensive an examina-
tion of those facts as does a full trial on the merits."' Guided by the
112 Id. at 243.
118 See Florida Trailer Sr Equip. Co. v. Deal, 284 F.2d 567, 571 (5th Cir. 1960).
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three-step procedure in Moses, the courts should be able to estimate
the measure of damages with reasonable accuracy.
CONCLUSION
In recently instituted derivative suits, many mutual fund share-
holders have challenged the failure of fund advisers to recapture cer-
tain brokerage commissions paid on fund portfolio transactions. Many
of these suits are now pending before the courts and will probably be
resolved by settlement agreements between the parties to the disputes.
The courts will have to approve these settlements and, as guardians of
the shareholders' interests, will have to insure that the agreements are
fair and adequate when measured by the shareholders' probability of
success at trial and an appropriate measure of damages.
It is submitted that gauging the shareholders' probability of suc-
cess and estimating the measure of damages by the Moses guidelines
should enable the courts to execute effectively their role as guardians
of the shareholders' interests by making realistic determinations of the
fairness and adequacy of settlement offers. A reasonable approxima-
tion of the measure of damages will apprise the courts of the extent to
which the plaintiffs have suffered a loss. The courts will be able to esti-
mate fairly, in terms of the probability of success, what portion of this
amount would have been recovered had there been a full trial on the
merits. Having estimated the probable recovery at trial, the courts will
then be able to approve, as fair and adequate, settlement offers which
realistically reflect this recovery, making allowances for such mitigating
factors as the time and expense saved by not going to trial, and the
speedy 'receipt of settlement payments as contrasted with delayed re-
covery while defendants exhaust their procedural remedies.
JAMES J. SHIRLEY
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